Abstract
Given the dominance of online platforms in attracting consumers and advertisers, online publishers are squeezed between declining traffic and advertising revenues from their website content. In turn, super platforms, the dominant content dissemination platforms, such as Google and Facebook, are monetizing online content at the expense of publishers by selling ad impressions in advertising auctions. In this work, we analyze publishers’ possibilities of forming a coalition and show that, under a set of assumptions, the optimal strategy for publishers is cooperation against a super platform rather than posting content on the super platform. Not choosing to publish on a super platform can yield the whole coalition more traffic, enabling some individual publishers to recoup the lost traffic. We further show that if the coalition does not forbid diversification, most publishers choose both coalition and super platform.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Social Informatics - 10th International Conference, SocInfo 2018, Proceedings |
Editors | Steffen Staab, Olessia Koltsova, Dmitry I. Ignatov |
Publisher | Springer Verlag |
Pages | 251-260 |
Number of pages | 10 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783030011581 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2018 |
Event | 10th Conference on Social Informatics, SocInfo 2018 - Saint-Petersburg, Russian Federation Duration: 25 Sep 2018 → 28 Sep 2018 |
Publication series
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
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Volume | 11186 LNCS |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Other
Other | 10th Conference on Social Informatics, SocInfo 2018 |
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Country | Russian Federation |
City | Saint-Petersburg |
Period | 25/9/18 → 28/9/18 |
Fingerprint
Keywords
- Advertising
- Media markets
- Online content
- Super platforms
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Theoretical Computer Science
- Computer Science(all)
Cite this
With or without super platforms? Analyzing online publishers’ strategies in the game of traffic. / Salminen, Joni; Maslennikov, Dmitry; Jansen, Bernard; Olkkonen, Rami.
Social Informatics - 10th International Conference, SocInfo 2018, Proceedings. ed. / Steffen Staab; Olessia Koltsova; Dmitry I. Ignatov. Springer Verlag, 2018. p. 251-260 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11186 LNCS).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - With or without super platforms? Analyzing online publishers’ strategies in the game of traffic
AU - Salminen, Joni
AU - Maslennikov, Dmitry
AU - Jansen, Bernard
AU - Olkkonen, Rami
PY - 2018/1/1
Y1 - 2018/1/1
N2 - Given the dominance of online platforms in attracting consumers and advertisers, online publishers are squeezed between declining traffic and advertising revenues from their website content. In turn, super platforms, the dominant content dissemination platforms, such as Google and Facebook, are monetizing online content at the expense of publishers by selling ad impressions in advertising auctions. In this work, we analyze publishers’ possibilities of forming a coalition and show that, under a set of assumptions, the optimal strategy for publishers is cooperation against a super platform rather than posting content on the super platform. Not choosing to publish on a super platform can yield the whole coalition more traffic, enabling some individual publishers to recoup the lost traffic. We further show that if the coalition does not forbid diversification, most publishers choose both coalition and super platform.
AB - Given the dominance of online platforms in attracting consumers and advertisers, online publishers are squeezed between declining traffic and advertising revenues from their website content. In turn, super platforms, the dominant content dissemination platforms, such as Google and Facebook, are monetizing online content at the expense of publishers by selling ad impressions in advertising auctions. In this work, we analyze publishers’ possibilities of forming a coalition and show that, under a set of assumptions, the optimal strategy for publishers is cooperation against a super platform rather than posting content on the super platform. Not choosing to publish on a super platform can yield the whole coalition more traffic, enabling some individual publishers to recoup the lost traffic. We further show that if the coalition does not forbid diversification, most publishers choose both coalition and super platform.
KW - Advertising
KW - Media markets
KW - Online content
KW - Super platforms
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85057225868&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85057225868&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-01159-8_24
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-01159-8_24
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85057225868
SN - 9783030011581
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 251
EP - 260
BT - Social Informatics - 10th International Conference, SocInfo 2018, Proceedings
A2 - Staab, Steffen
A2 - Koltsova, Olessia
A2 - Ignatov, Dmitry I.
PB - Springer Verlag
ER -