Why Expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators: Accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

2 Citations (Scopus)
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInstitutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court
PublisherUniversity Press of Virginia
Pages24-42
Number of pages19
ISBN (Print)9780813925271
Publication statusPublished - 28 Sep 2012
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Rogers, J. (2012). Why Expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators: Accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference. In Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court (pp. 24-42). University Press of Virginia.