Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators

Accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

The preceding essay argued that Supreme Court justices behave strategically, depending on whether they are resolving constitutional or statutory questions. This essay addresses a court's relationship with the elected branches from a different angle, one that considers when judges who want the law to reflect their views nevertheless will defer to legislatures. A strong reason for judicial deference is anchored in the institutional characteristics of legislatures, courts, and their interaction. Policy-oriented judges, it is argued, will rationally defer to legislative decisions even if the judges have greater expertise than any individual legislator, because legislatures can aggregate information as well as aggregate preferences. The implications of this argument also are consistent with "twotiered" judicial review in which courts sometimes review legislation deferentially and sometimes review legislation with heightened scrutiny.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInstitutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court
PublisherUniversity of Virginia Press
Pages44-62
Number of pages19
ISBN (Electronic)9780813934198
ISBN (Print)9780813925271
Publication statusPublished - 5 Oct 2012
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

expert
legislation
Supreme Court
expertise
justice
Law
interaction

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)

Cite this

Rogers, J. (2012). Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators: Accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference. In Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court (pp. 44-62). University of Virginia Press.

Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators : Accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference. / Rogers, James.

Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court. University of Virginia Press, 2012. p. 44-62.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Rogers, J 2012, Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators: Accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference. in Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court. University of Virginia Press, pp. 44-62.
Rogers J. Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators: Accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference. In Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court. University of Virginia Press. 2012. p. 44-62
Rogers, James. / Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators : Accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference. Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court. University of Virginia Press, 2012. pp. 44-62
@inbook{0b58925be614494783a36317984b48bd,
title = "Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators: Accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference",
abstract = "The preceding essay argued that Supreme Court justices behave strategically, depending on whether they are resolving constitutional or statutory questions. This essay addresses a court's relationship with the elected branches from a different angle, one that considers when judges who want the law to reflect their views nevertheless will defer to legislatures. A strong reason for judicial deference is anchored in the institutional characteristics of legislatures, courts, and their interaction. Policy-oriented judges, it is argued, will rationally defer to legislative decisions even if the judges have greater expertise than any individual legislator, because legislatures can aggregate information as well as aggregate preferences. The implications of this argument also are consistent with {"}twotiered{"} judicial review in which courts sometimes review legislation deferentially and sometimes review legislation with heightened scrutiny.",
author = "James Rogers",
year = "2012",
month = "10",
day = "5",
language = "English",
isbn = "9780813925271",
pages = "44--62",
booktitle = "Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court",
publisher = "University of Virginia Press",

}

TY - CHAP

T1 - Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators

T2 - Accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference

AU - Rogers, James

PY - 2012/10/5

Y1 - 2012/10/5

N2 - The preceding essay argued that Supreme Court justices behave strategically, depending on whether they are resolving constitutional or statutory questions. This essay addresses a court's relationship with the elected branches from a different angle, one that considers when judges who want the law to reflect their views nevertheless will defer to legislatures. A strong reason for judicial deference is anchored in the institutional characteristics of legislatures, courts, and their interaction. Policy-oriented judges, it is argued, will rationally defer to legislative decisions even if the judges have greater expertise than any individual legislator, because legislatures can aggregate information as well as aggregate preferences. The implications of this argument also are consistent with "twotiered" judicial review in which courts sometimes review legislation deferentially and sometimes review legislation with heightened scrutiny.

AB - The preceding essay argued that Supreme Court justices behave strategically, depending on whether they are resolving constitutional or statutory questions. This essay addresses a court's relationship with the elected branches from a different angle, one that considers when judges who want the law to reflect their views nevertheless will defer to legislatures. A strong reason for judicial deference is anchored in the institutional characteristics of legislatures, courts, and their interaction. Policy-oriented judges, it is argued, will rationally defer to legislative decisions even if the judges have greater expertise than any individual legislator, because legislatures can aggregate information as well as aggregate preferences. The implications of this argument also are consistent with "twotiered" judicial review in which courts sometimes review legislation deferentially and sometimes review legislation with heightened scrutiny.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84928202764&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84928202764&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9780813925271

SP - 44

EP - 62

BT - Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court

PB - University of Virginia Press

ER -