Sponsored search, market equilibria, and the Hungarian method

Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Ingmar Weber

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Two-sided matching markets play a prominent role in economic theory. A prime example of such a market is the sponsored search market where n advertisers compete for the assignment of one of k sponsored search results, also known as "slots", for certain keywords they are interested in. Here, as in other markets of that kind, market equilibria correspond to stable matchings. In this paper, we show how to modify Kuhn's Hungarian Method (Kuhn, 1955) so that it finds an optimal stable matching between advertisers and advertising slots in settings with generalized linear utilities, per-bidder-item reserve prices, and per-bidder-item maximum prices. The only algorithm for this problem presented so far (Aggarwal et al., 2009) requires the market to be in "general position". We do not make this assumption.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLeibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs
Pages287-298
Number of pages12
Volume5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event27th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, STACS 2010 - Nancy, France
Duration: 4 Mar 20106 Mar 2010

Other

Other27th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, STACS 2010
CountryFrance
CityNancy
Period4/3/106/3/10

Fingerprint

Marketing
Economics

Keywords

  • Envy-freeallocation
  • General auction mechanism
  • General position
  • Stable matching

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software

Cite this

Dütting, P., Henzinger, M., & Weber, I. (2010). Sponsored search, market equilibria, and the Hungarian method. In Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs (Vol. 5, pp. 287-298) https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2010.2463

Sponsored search, market equilibria, and the Hungarian method. / Dütting, Paul; Henzinger, Monika; Weber, Ingmar.

Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs. Vol. 5 2010. p. 287-298.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Dütting, P, Henzinger, M & Weber, I 2010, Sponsored search, market equilibria, and the Hungarian method. in Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs. vol. 5, pp. 287-298, 27th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, STACS 2010, Nancy, France, 4/3/10. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2010.2463
Dütting P, Henzinger M, Weber I. Sponsored search, market equilibria, and the Hungarian method. In Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs. Vol. 5. 2010. p. 287-298 https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2010.2463
Dütting, Paul ; Henzinger, Monika ; Weber, Ingmar. / Sponsored search, market equilibria, and the Hungarian method. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs. Vol. 5 2010. pp. 287-298
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