Small changes, big changes: An updated view on the android permission system

Yury Zhauniarovich, Olga Gadyatskaya

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Since the appearance of Android, its permission system was central to many studies of Android security. For a long time, the description of the architecture provided by Enck et al. in [31] was immutably used in various research papers. The introduction of highly anticipated runtime permissions in Android 6.0 forced us to reconsider this model. To our surprise, the permission system evolved with almost every release. After analysis of 16 Android versions, we can confirm that the modifications, especially introduced in Android 6.0, considerably impact the aptness of old conclusions and tools for newer releases. For instance, since Android 6.0 some signature permissions, previously granted only to apps signed with a platform certificate, can be granted to third-party apps even if they are signed with a non-platform certificate; many permissions considered before as threatening are now granted by default. In this paper, we review in detail the updated system, introduced changes, and their security implications. We highlight some bizarre behaviors, which may be of interest for developers and security researchers. We also found a number of bugs during our analysis, and provided patches to AOSP where possible.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationResearch in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses - 19th International Symposium, RAID 2016, Proceedings
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages346-367
Number of pages22
ISBN (Print)9783319457185
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2016
Event19th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses, RAID 2016 - Paris, France
Duration: 19 Sep 201621 Sep 2016

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume9854 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other19th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses, RAID 2016
CountryFrance
CityParis
Period19/9/1621/9/16

Fingerprint

Application programs
Certificate
Signed
Patch
Signature
Model

Keywords

  • Android security
  • Compatibility challenges
  • Permission system
  • Runtime permissions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Zhauniarovich, Y., & Gadyatskaya, O. (2016). Small changes, big changes: An updated view on the android permission system. In Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses - 19th International Symposium, RAID 2016, Proceedings (pp. 346-367). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9854 LNCS). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45719-2_16

Small changes, big changes : An updated view on the android permission system. / Zhauniarovich, Yury; Gadyatskaya, Olga.

Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses - 19th International Symposium, RAID 2016, Proceedings. Springer Verlag, 2016. p. 346-367 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9854 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Zhauniarovich, Y & Gadyatskaya, O 2016, Small changes, big changes: An updated view on the android permission system. in Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses - 19th International Symposium, RAID 2016, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 9854 LNCS, Springer Verlag, pp. 346-367, 19th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses, RAID 2016, Paris, France, 19/9/16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45719-2_16
Zhauniarovich Y, Gadyatskaya O. Small changes, big changes: An updated view on the android permission system. In Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses - 19th International Symposium, RAID 2016, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2016. p. 346-367. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45719-2_16
Zhauniarovich, Yury ; Gadyatskaya, Olga. / Small changes, big changes : An updated view on the android permission system. Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses - 19th International Symposium, RAID 2016, Proceedings. Springer Verlag, 2016. pp. 346-367 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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