On the modeling and analysis of obligations

Keith Irwin, Ting Yu, William H. Winsborough

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

71 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Traditional security policies largely focus on access control requirements, which specify who can access what under what circumstances. Besides access control requirements, the availability of services in many applications often further imposes obligation requirements, which specify what actions have to be taken by a subject in the future as a condition of getting certain privileges at present. However, it is not clear yet what the implications of obligation policies are concerning the security goals of a system.In this paper, we propose a formal metamodel that captures the key aspects of a system that are relevant to obligation management. We formally investigate the interpretation of security policies from the perspective of obligations, and define secure system states based on the concept of accountability. We also study the complexity of checking a state's accountability under different assumptions about a system.

Original languageEnglish
Article number1180423
Pages (from-to)134-143
Number of pages10
JournalProceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2006
EventCCS 2006: 13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security - Alexandria, VA, United States
Duration: 30 Oct 20063 Nov 2006

    Fingerprint

Keywords

  • Obligations
  • Policy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this