MPC

Mitigating stealthy power control attacks in wireless ad hoc networks

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Local monitoring has been demonstrated as a powerful technique for mitigating security attacks in multi-hop ad-hoc networks. In local monitoring, nodes overhear partial neighborhood communication to detect misbehavior such as packet drop or delay. However, local monitoring as presented in the literature is vulnerable to stealthy packet dropping through transmission power control. Stealthy packet dropping disrupts the packet from reaching the destination by malicious behavior at an intermediate node. However, the malicious node gives the impression to its neighbors that it performed the legitimate forwarding action. Moreover, a legitimate node comes under suspicion. We provide a protocol called MPC to remedy the attack. MPC expands the set of possible monitors of a node by redefining the monitor role and functionality. We show through analysis and simulation that the basic local monitoring (BLM) fails to efficiently mitigate stealthy power control attacks while MPC successfully mitigates them.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2009
Externally publishedYes
Event2009 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2009 - Honolulu, HI, United States
Duration: 30 Nov 20094 Dec 2009

Other

Other2009 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2009
CountryUnited States
CityHonolulu, HI
Period30/11/094/12/09

Fingerprint

Wireless ad hoc networks
Power control
Monitoring
Ad hoc networks
Network protocols
Communication

Keywords

  • Local monitoring
  • Malicious node
  • Multi-hop wireless networks
  • Packet dropping
  • Transmission power control

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

MPC : Mitigating stealthy power control attacks in wireless ad hoc networks. / Khalil, Issa.

GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference. 2009. 5425559.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Khalil, I 2009, MPC: Mitigating stealthy power control attacks in wireless ad hoc networks. in GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference., 5425559, 2009 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2009, Honolulu, HI, United States, 30/11/09. https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2009.5425559
Khalil, Issa. / MPC : Mitigating stealthy power control attacks in wireless ad hoc networks. GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference. 2009.
@inproceedings{c88561a4550c419288d4986e52241c51,
title = "MPC: Mitigating stealthy power control attacks in wireless ad hoc networks",
abstract = "Local monitoring has been demonstrated as a powerful technique for mitigating security attacks in multi-hop ad-hoc networks. In local monitoring, nodes overhear partial neighborhood communication to detect misbehavior such as packet drop or delay. However, local monitoring as presented in the literature is vulnerable to stealthy packet dropping through transmission power control. Stealthy packet dropping disrupts the packet from reaching the destination by malicious behavior at an intermediate node. However, the malicious node gives the impression to its neighbors that it performed the legitimate forwarding action. Moreover, a legitimate node comes under suspicion. We provide a protocol called MPC to remedy the attack. MPC expands the set of possible monitors of a node by redefining the monitor role and functionality. We show through analysis and simulation that the basic local monitoring (BLM) fails to efficiently mitigate stealthy power control attacks while MPC successfully mitigates them.",
keywords = "Local monitoring, Malicious node, Multi-hop wireless networks, Packet dropping, Transmission power control",
author = "Issa Khalil",
year = "2009",
month = "12",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1109/GLOCOM.2009.5425559",
language = "English",
isbn = "9781424441488",
booktitle = "GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - MPC

T2 - Mitigating stealthy power control attacks in wireless ad hoc networks

AU - Khalil, Issa

PY - 2009/12/1

Y1 - 2009/12/1

N2 - Local monitoring has been demonstrated as a powerful technique for mitigating security attacks in multi-hop ad-hoc networks. In local monitoring, nodes overhear partial neighborhood communication to detect misbehavior such as packet drop or delay. However, local monitoring as presented in the literature is vulnerable to stealthy packet dropping through transmission power control. Stealthy packet dropping disrupts the packet from reaching the destination by malicious behavior at an intermediate node. However, the malicious node gives the impression to its neighbors that it performed the legitimate forwarding action. Moreover, a legitimate node comes under suspicion. We provide a protocol called MPC to remedy the attack. MPC expands the set of possible monitors of a node by redefining the monitor role and functionality. We show through analysis and simulation that the basic local monitoring (BLM) fails to efficiently mitigate stealthy power control attacks while MPC successfully mitigates them.

AB - Local monitoring has been demonstrated as a powerful technique for mitigating security attacks in multi-hop ad-hoc networks. In local monitoring, nodes overhear partial neighborhood communication to detect misbehavior such as packet drop or delay. However, local monitoring as presented in the literature is vulnerable to stealthy packet dropping through transmission power control. Stealthy packet dropping disrupts the packet from reaching the destination by malicious behavior at an intermediate node. However, the malicious node gives the impression to its neighbors that it performed the legitimate forwarding action. Moreover, a legitimate node comes under suspicion. We provide a protocol called MPC to remedy the attack. MPC expands the set of possible monitors of a node by redefining the monitor role and functionality. We show through analysis and simulation that the basic local monitoring (BLM) fails to efficiently mitigate stealthy power control attacks while MPC successfully mitigates them.

KW - Local monitoring

KW - Malicious node

KW - Multi-hop wireless networks

KW - Packet dropping

KW - Transmission power control

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77951599568&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=77951599568&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/GLOCOM.2009.5425559

DO - 10.1109/GLOCOM.2009.5425559

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 9781424441488

BT - GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference

ER -