Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court

James Rogers, Roy B. Flemming, Jon R. Bond

Research output: Book/ReportBook

Abstract

Over the course of the past decade, the behavioral analysis of decisions by the Supreme Court has turned to game theory to gain new insights into this important institution in American politics. Game theory highlights the role of strategic interactions between the Court and other institutions in the decisions the Court makes as well as in the relations among the justices as they make their decisions. Rather than assume that the justices' votes reveal their sincere preferences, students of law and politics have come to examine how the strategic concerns of the justices lead to "sophisticated" behavior as they seek to maximize achievement of their goals when faced with constraints on their ability to do so. In Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court, James Rogers, Roy Flemming, and Jon Bond gather various essays that use game theory to explain the Supreme Court's interactions with Congress, the states, and the lower courts. Offering new ways of understanding the complexity and consequences of these interactions, the volume joins a growing body of work that considers these influential interactions among various branches of the U.S. government.

Original languageEnglish
PublisherUniversity of Virginia Press
Number of pages335
ISBN (Electronic)9780813934198
ISBN (Print)9780813925271
Publication statusPublished - 5 Oct 2012
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Supreme Court
game theory
justice
interaction
politics
voter
Law
ability
student

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)

Cite this

Rogers, J., Flemming, R. B., & Bond, J. R. (2012). Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court. University of Virginia Press.

Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court. / Rogers, James; Flemming, Roy B.; Bond, Jon R.

University of Virginia Press, 2012. 335 p.

Research output: Book/ReportBook

Rogers, J, Flemming, RB & Bond, JR 2012, Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court. University of Virginia Press.
Rogers J, Flemming RB, Bond JR. Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court. University of Virginia Press, 2012. 335 p.
Rogers, James ; Flemming, Roy B. ; Bond, Jon R. / Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court. University of Virginia Press, 2012. 335 p.
@book{8d127736a65a4f028002f7d41b36a276,
title = "Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court",
abstract = "Over the course of the past decade, the behavioral analysis of decisions by the Supreme Court has turned to game theory to gain new insights into this important institution in American politics. Game theory highlights the role of strategic interactions between the Court and other institutions in the decisions the Court makes as well as in the relations among the justices as they make their decisions. Rather than assume that the justices' votes reveal their sincere preferences, students of law and politics have come to examine how the strategic concerns of the justices lead to {"}sophisticated{"} behavior as they seek to maximize achievement of their goals when faced with constraints on their ability to do so. In Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court, James Rogers, Roy Flemming, and Jon Bond gather various essays that use game theory to explain the Supreme Court's interactions with Congress, the states, and the lower courts. Offering new ways of understanding the complexity and consequences of these interactions, the volume joins a growing body of work that considers these influential interactions among various branches of the U.S. government.",
author = "James Rogers and Flemming, {Roy B.} and Bond, {Jon R.}",
year = "2012",
month = "10",
day = "5",
language = "English",
isbn = "9780813925271",
publisher = "University of Virginia Press",

}

TY - BOOK

T1 - Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court

AU - Rogers, James

AU - Flemming, Roy B.

AU - Bond, Jon R.

PY - 2012/10/5

Y1 - 2012/10/5

N2 - Over the course of the past decade, the behavioral analysis of decisions by the Supreme Court has turned to game theory to gain new insights into this important institution in American politics. Game theory highlights the role of strategic interactions between the Court and other institutions in the decisions the Court makes as well as in the relations among the justices as they make their decisions. Rather than assume that the justices' votes reveal their sincere preferences, students of law and politics have come to examine how the strategic concerns of the justices lead to "sophisticated" behavior as they seek to maximize achievement of their goals when faced with constraints on their ability to do so. In Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court, James Rogers, Roy Flemming, and Jon Bond gather various essays that use game theory to explain the Supreme Court's interactions with Congress, the states, and the lower courts. Offering new ways of understanding the complexity and consequences of these interactions, the volume joins a growing body of work that considers these influential interactions among various branches of the U.S. government.

AB - Over the course of the past decade, the behavioral analysis of decisions by the Supreme Court has turned to game theory to gain new insights into this important institution in American politics. Game theory highlights the role of strategic interactions between the Court and other institutions in the decisions the Court makes as well as in the relations among the justices as they make their decisions. Rather than assume that the justices' votes reveal their sincere preferences, students of law and politics have come to examine how the strategic concerns of the justices lead to "sophisticated" behavior as they seek to maximize achievement of their goals when faced with constraints on their ability to do so. In Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court, James Rogers, Roy Flemming, and Jon Bond gather various essays that use game theory to explain the Supreme Court's interactions with Congress, the states, and the lower courts. Offering new ways of understanding the complexity and consequences of these interactions, the volume joins a growing body of work that considers these influential interactions among various branches of the U.S. government.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84928177113&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84928177113&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Book

AN - SCOPUS:84928177113

SN - 9780813925271

BT - Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court

PB - University of Virginia Press

ER -