How much is your personal recommendation worth?

Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Ingmar Weber

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Suppose you buy a new laptop and, simply because you like it so much, you recommend it to friends, encouraging them to purchase it as well. What would be an adequate price for the vendor of the laptop to pay for your recommendation? Personal recommendations like this are of considerable commercial interest, but unlike in sponsored search auctions there can be no truthful prices. Despite this "lack of truthfulness" the vendor of the product might still decide to pay you for recommendation e.g. because she wants to (i) provide you with an additional incentive to actually recommend her or to (ii) increase your satisfaction and/or brand loyalty. This leads us to investigate a pricing scheme based on the Shapley value [5] that satisfies certain "axioms of fairness". We find that it is vulnerable to manipulations and show how to overcome these difficulties using the anonymity-proof Shapley value of [4].

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 19th International Conference on World Wide Web, WWW '10
Pages1085-1086
Number of pages2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 21 Jul 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event19th International World Wide Web Conference, WWW2010 - Raleigh, NC, United States
Duration: 26 Apr 201030 Apr 2010

Other

Other19th International World Wide Web Conference, WWW2010
CountryUnited States
CityRaleigh, NC
Period26/4/1030/4/10

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Keywords

  • pricing mechanisms
  • recommendations
  • shapley value

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Science Applications

Cite this

Dütting, P., Henzinger, M., & Weber, I. (2010). How much is your personal recommendation worth? In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on World Wide Web, WWW '10 (pp. 1085-1086) https://doi.org/10.1145/1772690.1772816

How much is your personal recommendation worth? / Dütting, Paul; Henzinger, Monika; Weber, Ingmar.

Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on World Wide Web, WWW '10. 2010. p. 1085-1086.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Dütting, P, Henzinger, M & Weber, I 2010, How much is your personal recommendation worth? in Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on World Wide Web, WWW '10. pp. 1085-1086, 19th International World Wide Web Conference, WWW2010, Raleigh, NC, United States, 26/4/10. https://doi.org/10.1145/1772690.1772816
Dütting P, Henzinger M, Weber I. How much is your personal recommendation worth? In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on World Wide Web, WWW '10. 2010. p. 1085-1086 https://doi.org/10.1145/1772690.1772816
Dütting, Paul ; Henzinger, Monika ; Weber, Ingmar. / How much is your personal recommendation worth?. Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on World Wide Web, WWW '10. 2010. pp. 1085-1086
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