Honeypots: Practical means to validate malicious fault assumptions

Marc Dacier, Fabien Pouget, Hervé Debar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

27 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we report on an experiment run with several honeypots for 4 months. The motivation of this work resides in our wish to use data collected by honeypots to validate fault assumptions required when designing intrusion-tolerant systems. This work in progress establishes the foundations for a feasibility study into that direction. After a review of the state of the art with respect to honeypots, we present our test bed, discuss results obtained and lessons learned Avenues for future work are also proposed.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - IEEE Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing
Pages383-388
Number of pages6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2004
Externally publishedYes
EventProceedings - 10th IEEE Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing - Papeete Tahiti
Duration: 3 Mar 20045 Mar 2004

Other

OtherProceedings - 10th IEEE Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing
CityPapeete Tahiti
Period3/3/045/3/04

Fingerprint

Experiments

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Engineering(all)

Cite this

Dacier, M., Pouget, F., & Debar, H. (2004). Honeypots: Practical means to validate malicious fault assumptions. In Proceedings - IEEE Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (pp. 383-388) https://doi.org/10.1109/PRDC.2004.1276594

Honeypots : Practical means to validate malicious fault assumptions. / Dacier, Marc; Pouget, Fabien; Debar, Hervé.

Proceedings - IEEE Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing. 2004. p. 383-388.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Dacier, M, Pouget, F & Debar, H 2004, Honeypots: Practical means to validate malicious fault assumptions. in Proceedings - IEEE Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing. pp. 383-388, Proceedings - 10th IEEE Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing, Papeete Tahiti, 3/3/04. https://doi.org/10.1109/PRDC.2004.1276594
Dacier M, Pouget F, Debar H. Honeypots: Practical means to validate malicious fault assumptions. In Proceedings - IEEE Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing. 2004. p. 383-388 https://doi.org/10.1109/PRDC.2004.1276594
Dacier, Marc ; Pouget, Fabien ; Debar, Hervé. / Honeypots : Practical means to validate malicious fault assumptions. Proceedings - IEEE Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing. 2004. pp. 383-388
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