Free riding in state legislatures

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper applies the theory of team production to the legislative process and tests the empirical implications of that theory using a unique state-level data set. Empirically testable hypotheses are derived from the theory, including predictions that free riding will increase as chamber (or majority) size increases, and that legislative institutions (such as committee structure and staffing levels) can mitigate free riding. The hypotheses are tested using a pooled state-level data set developed from the session laws of twenty-three state legislatures. The empirical results are consistent with the major hypotheses.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)59-76
Number of pages18
JournalPublic Choice
Volume113
Issue number1-2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2002
Externally publishedYes

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staffing level
chamber
Law
Legislatures
Free-riding
Prediction
Empirical results
Team production
Staffing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Free riding in state legislatures. / Rogers, James.

In: Public Choice, Vol. 113, No. 1-2, 2002, p. 59-76.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Rogers, James. / Free riding in state legislatures. In: Public Choice. 2002 ; Vol. 113, No. 1-2. pp. 59-76.
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