False data injection attack in smart grid topology control: Vulnerability and countermeasure

Tian Lan, Wenzong Wang, Garng Morton Huang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Cyber security is a crucial factor for modern power system as many applications are heavily relied on the result of state estimation. Therefore, it is necessary to assess and enhance cyber security for new applications in power system. As an emerging technology, smart grid topology control has been investigated in stability and reliability perspectives while the associated cyber security issue is not studied before. In successful false data injection attack (FDIA) against AC state estimation, attacker could alter online stability check result by decreasing real power flow measurement on the switching target line to undermine physical system stability in topology control. The physical impact of FDIA on system control operation and stability are illustrated. The vulnerability is discussed on perfect FDIA and imperfect FDIA against residue based bad data detection and corresponding countermeasure is proposed to secure critical substations in the system. The vulnerability and countermeasure are demonstrated on IEEE 24 bus reliability test system (RTS).

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2017 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2017
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages1-5
Number of pages5
Volume2018-January
ISBN (Electronic)9781538622124
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 29 Jan 2018
Event2017 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2017 - Chicago, United States
Duration: 16 Jul 201720 Jul 2017

Other

Other2017 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2017
CountryUnited States
CityChicago
Period16/7/1720/7/17

Fingerprint

Topology
State estimation
Flow measurement
System stability
Control systems

Keywords

  • FDIA
  • Power system state estimation
  • Stability check
  • Topology control

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
  • Nuclear Energy and Engineering
  • Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Lan, T., Wang, W., & Huang, G. M. (2018). False data injection attack in smart grid topology control: Vulnerability and countermeasure. In 2017 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2017 (Vol. 2018-January, pp. 1-5). IEEE Computer Society. https://doi.org/10.1109/PESGM.2017.8274317

False data injection attack in smart grid topology control : Vulnerability and countermeasure. / Lan, Tian; Wang, Wenzong; Huang, Garng Morton.

2017 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2017. Vol. 2018-January IEEE Computer Society, 2018. p. 1-5.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Lan, T, Wang, W & Huang, GM 2018, False data injection attack in smart grid topology control: Vulnerability and countermeasure. in 2017 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2017. vol. 2018-January, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 1-5, 2017 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2017, Chicago, United States, 16/7/17. https://doi.org/10.1109/PESGM.2017.8274317
Lan T, Wang W, Huang GM. False data injection attack in smart grid topology control: Vulnerability and countermeasure. In 2017 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2017. Vol. 2018-January. IEEE Computer Society. 2018. p. 1-5 https://doi.org/10.1109/PESGM.2017.8274317
Lan, Tian ; Wang, Wenzong ; Huang, Garng Morton. / False data injection attack in smart grid topology control : Vulnerability and countermeasure. 2017 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2017. Vol. 2018-January IEEE Computer Society, 2018. pp. 1-5
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