Abstract
In a previous article (Rogers 1998), I showed that the bicameral chamber that originates enacted legislation tends to realize policy outcomes closer to the preference of its median legislator than does the chamber that votes second on legislation. All things being equal, this "first-mover advantage" implies that each chamber could be expected to originate roughly half of all enacted legislation. But all other things are not equal in U.S. state bicameral legislatures. Drawing on an expanded dataset, I innovate and test a number of additional hypotheses related to bicameral voting sequence. My results account for the effects of constitutional, institutional, and electoral variables on bicameral sequence.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 29-42 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Legislative Studies Quarterly |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - 2005 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
Cite this
Empirical determinants of bicameral sequence in state legislatures. / Rogers, James.
In: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2005, p. 29-42.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Empirical determinants of bicameral sequence in state legislatures
AU - Rogers, James
PY - 2005
Y1 - 2005
N2 - In a previous article (Rogers 1998), I showed that the bicameral chamber that originates enacted legislation tends to realize policy outcomes closer to the preference of its median legislator than does the chamber that votes second on legislation. All things being equal, this "first-mover advantage" implies that each chamber could be expected to originate roughly half of all enacted legislation. But all other things are not equal in U.S. state bicameral legislatures. Drawing on an expanded dataset, I innovate and test a number of additional hypotheses related to bicameral voting sequence. My results account for the effects of constitutional, institutional, and electoral variables on bicameral sequence.
AB - In a previous article (Rogers 1998), I showed that the bicameral chamber that originates enacted legislation tends to realize policy outcomes closer to the preference of its median legislator than does the chamber that votes second on legislation. All things being equal, this "first-mover advantage" implies that each chamber could be expected to originate roughly half of all enacted legislation. But all other things are not equal in U.S. state bicameral legislatures. Drawing on an expanded dataset, I innovate and test a number of additional hypotheses related to bicameral voting sequence. My results account for the effects of constitutional, institutional, and electoral variables on bicameral sequence.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=27944489107&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:27944489107
VL - 30
SP - 29
EP - 42
JO - Legislative Studies Quarterly
JF - Legislative Studies Quarterly
SN - 0362-9805
IS - 1
ER -