DICAS

Detection, diagnosis and isolation of control attacks in sensor networks

Issa Khalil, Saurabh Bagchi, Cristina Nina-Rotaru

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

49 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Sensor networks enable a wide range of applications in both military and civilian domains. However, the deployment scenarios, the functionality requirements, and the limited capabilities of these networks expose them to a wide-range of attacks against control traffic (such as wormholes, Sybil attacks, rushing attacks, etc). In this paper we propose a lightweight protocol called DICAS that mitigates these attacks by detecting, diagnosing, and isolating the malicious nodes. DICAS uses as a fundamental building block the ability of a node to oversee its neighboring nodes' communication. On top of DICAS, we build a secure routing protocol, LSR, which in addition supports multiple node-disjoint paths. We analyze the security guarantees of DICAS and use ns-2 simulations to show its effectiveness against three representative attacks. Overhead analysis is conducted to prove the lightweight nature of DICAS.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks, SecureComm 2005
Pages89-100
Number of pages12
Volume2005
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2005
Externally publishedYes
Event1st International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks, SecureComm 2005 - Athens, Greece
Duration: 5 Sep 20059 Sep 2005

Other

Other1st International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks, SecureComm 2005
CountryGreece
CityAthens
Period5/9/059/9/05

Fingerprint

Traffic control
Routing protocols
Sensor networks
Network protocols
Communication

Keywords

  • Control attack
  • Neighbor monitoring
  • Node-disjoint paths
  • Secure routing
  • Sensor network security

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Engineering(all)

Cite this

Khalil, I., Bagchi, S., & Nina-Rotaru, C. (2005). DICAS: Detection, diagnosis and isolation of control attacks in sensor networks. In Proceedings - First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks, SecureComm 2005 (Vol. 2005, pp. 89-100). [1607562] https://doi.org/10.1109/SECURECOMM.2005.17

DICAS : Detection, diagnosis and isolation of control attacks in sensor networks. / Khalil, Issa; Bagchi, Saurabh; Nina-Rotaru, Cristina.

Proceedings - First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks, SecureComm 2005. Vol. 2005 2005. p. 89-100 1607562.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Khalil, I, Bagchi, S & Nina-Rotaru, C 2005, DICAS: Detection, diagnosis and isolation of control attacks in sensor networks. in Proceedings - First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks, SecureComm 2005. vol. 2005, 1607562, pp. 89-100, 1st International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks, SecureComm 2005, Athens, Greece, 5/9/05. https://doi.org/10.1109/SECURECOMM.2005.17
Khalil I, Bagchi S, Nina-Rotaru C. DICAS: Detection, diagnosis and isolation of control attacks in sensor networks. In Proceedings - First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks, SecureComm 2005. Vol. 2005. 2005. p. 89-100. 1607562 https://doi.org/10.1109/SECURECOMM.2005.17
Khalil, Issa ; Bagchi, Saurabh ; Nina-Rotaru, Cristina. / DICAS : Detection, diagnosis and isolation of control attacks in sensor networks. Proceedings - First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks, SecureComm 2005. Vol. 2005 2005. pp. 89-100
@inproceedings{301505bcd44d4a7f99e274659ad5701e,
title = "DICAS: Detection, diagnosis and isolation of control attacks in sensor networks",
abstract = "Sensor networks enable a wide range of applications in both military and civilian domains. However, the deployment scenarios, the functionality requirements, and the limited capabilities of these networks expose them to a wide-range of attacks against control traffic (such as wormholes, Sybil attacks, rushing attacks, etc). In this paper we propose a lightweight protocol called DICAS that mitigates these attacks by detecting, diagnosing, and isolating the malicious nodes. DICAS uses as a fundamental building block the ability of a node to oversee its neighboring nodes' communication. On top of DICAS, we build a secure routing protocol, LSR, which in addition supports multiple node-disjoint paths. We analyze the security guarantees of DICAS and use ns-2 simulations to show its effectiveness against three representative attacks. Overhead analysis is conducted to prove the lightweight nature of DICAS.",
keywords = "Control attack, Neighbor monitoring, Node-disjoint paths, Secure routing, Sensor network security",
author = "Issa Khalil and Saurabh Bagchi and Cristina Nina-Rotaru",
year = "2005",
month = "12",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1109/SECURECOMM.2005.17",
language = "English",
isbn = "0769523692",
volume = "2005",
pages = "89--100",
booktitle = "Proceedings - First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks, SecureComm 2005",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - DICAS

T2 - Detection, diagnosis and isolation of control attacks in sensor networks

AU - Khalil, Issa

AU - Bagchi, Saurabh

AU - Nina-Rotaru, Cristina

PY - 2005/12/1

Y1 - 2005/12/1

N2 - Sensor networks enable a wide range of applications in both military and civilian domains. However, the deployment scenarios, the functionality requirements, and the limited capabilities of these networks expose them to a wide-range of attacks against control traffic (such as wormholes, Sybil attacks, rushing attacks, etc). In this paper we propose a lightweight protocol called DICAS that mitigates these attacks by detecting, diagnosing, and isolating the malicious nodes. DICAS uses as a fundamental building block the ability of a node to oversee its neighboring nodes' communication. On top of DICAS, we build a secure routing protocol, LSR, which in addition supports multiple node-disjoint paths. We analyze the security guarantees of DICAS and use ns-2 simulations to show its effectiveness against three representative attacks. Overhead analysis is conducted to prove the lightweight nature of DICAS.

AB - Sensor networks enable a wide range of applications in both military and civilian domains. However, the deployment scenarios, the functionality requirements, and the limited capabilities of these networks expose them to a wide-range of attacks against control traffic (such as wormholes, Sybil attacks, rushing attacks, etc). In this paper we propose a lightweight protocol called DICAS that mitigates these attacks by detecting, diagnosing, and isolating the malicious nodes. DICAS uses as a fundamental building block the ability of a node to oversee its neighboring nodes' communication. On top of DICAS, we build a secure routing protocol, LSR, which in addition supports multiple node-disjoint paths. We analyze the security guarantees of DICAS and use ns-2 simulations to show its effectiveness against three representative attacks. Overhead analysis is conducted to prove the lightweight nature of DICAS.

KW - Control attack

KW - Neighbor monitoring

KW - Node-disjoint paths

KW - Secure routing

KW - Sensor network security

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33847326821&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=33847326821&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/SECURECOMM.2005.17

DO - 10.1109/SECURECOMM.2005.17

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 0769523692

SN - 9780769523699

VL - 2005

SP - 89

EP - 100

BT - Proceedings - First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks, SecureComm 2005

ER -