Bidder optimal assignments for general utilities

Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Ingmar Weber

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has general, strictly monotonic utility functions ui,j(pj) expressing his utility of being matched to item j at price pj. For this setting we prove that a bidder optimal outcome always exists, even when the utility functions are non-linear and non-continuous. We give sufficient conditions under which every mechanism that finds a bidder optimal outcome is incentive compatible. We also give a mechanism that finds a bidder optimal outcome if the conditions for incentive compatibility are satisfied. The running time of this mechanism is exponential in the number of items, but polynomial in the number of bidders.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)22-32
Number of pages11
JournalTheoretical Computer Science
Volume478
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 25 Mar 2013

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Assignment
Utility Function
Incentive Compatibility
Monotonic Function
Polynomials
Incentives
Strictly
Polynomial
Sufficient Conditions

Keywords

  • Discontinuous utilities
  • Envy freeness
  • Lattice
  • Matching markets
  • Mechanism design

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Bidder optimal assignments for general utilities. / Dütting, Paul; Henzinger, Monika; Weber, Ingmar.

In: Theoretical Computer Science, Vol. 478, 25.03.2013, p. 22-32.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Dütting, Paul ; Henzinger, Monika ; Weber, Ingmar. / Bidder optimal assignments for general utilities. In: Theoretical Computer Science. 2013 ; Vol. 478. pp. 22-32.
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