An informational rationale for congruent bicameralism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

'Congruent' bicameralism exists when two chambers are similarly constituted and are expected generally to share the same house preferences. Many commentators have wondered whether there is any purpose for having a second chamber if it has the same house preferences as the first chamber, and hold that divergent house preferences are a necessary condition to justify bicameralism. Other commentators have argued that even if the chambers and their respective house preferences are congruent, the informational interaction between the chambers is sufficient for bicameralism to improve the quality of legislation relative to unicameralism. Developing a game theoretic model with informational uncertainty and with identically congruent bicameral chambers, the analysis demonstrates that the informational interaction of acoustically separated chambers can nonetheless improve the objective quality of legislation relative to legislation enacted by a unicameral legislature.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)123-151
Number of pages29
JournalJournal of Theoretical Politics
Volume13
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2001
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

bicameralism
chamber
legislation
interaction
uncertainty

Keywords

  • Bicameralism
  • Game theory
  • Information theory
  • Legislatures
  • Uicameralism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

An informational rationale for congruent bicameralism. / Rogers, James.

In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2001, p. 123-151.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{eab2cb7271f44c2bb92a0a53e2fd59cc,
title = "An informational rationale for congruent bicameralism",
abstract = "'Congruent' bicameralism exists when two chambers are similarly constituted and are expected generally to share the same house preferences. Many commentators have wondered whether there is any purpose for having a second chamber if it has the same house preferences as the first chamber, and hold that divergent house preferences are a necessary condition to justify bicameralism. Other commentators have argued that even if the chambers and their respective house preferences are congruent, the informational interaction between the chambers is sufficient for bicameralism to improve the quality of legislation relative to unicameralism. Developing a game theoretic model with informational uncertainty and with identically congruent bicameral chambers, the analysis demonstrates that the informational interaction of acoustically separated chambers can nonetheless improve the objective quality of legislation relative to legislation enacted by a unicameral legislature.",
keywords = "Bicameralism, Game theory, Information theory, Legislatures, Uicameralism",
author = "James Rogers",
year = "2001",
doi = "10.1177/0951692801013002001",
language = "English",
volume = "13",
pages = "123--151",
journal = "Journal of Theoretical Politics",
issn = "0951-6298",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Ltd",
number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - An informational rationale for congruent bicameralism

AU - Rogers, James

PY - 2001

Y1 - 2001

N2 - 'Congruent' bicameralism exists when two chambers are similarly constituted and are expected generally to share the same house preferences. Many commentators have wondered whether there is any purpose for having a second chamber if it has the same house preferences as the first chamber, and hold that divergent house preferences are a necessary condition to justify bicameralism. Other commentators have argued that even if the chambers and their respective house preferences are congruent, the informational interaction between the chambers is sufficient for bicameralism to improve the quality of legislation relative to unicameralism. Developing a game theoretic model with informational uncertainty and with identically congruent bicameral chambers, the analysis demonstrates that the informational interaction of acoustically separated chambers can nonetheless improve the objective quality of legislation relative to legislation enacted by a unicameral legislature.

AB - 'Congruent' bicameralism exists when two chambers are similarly constituted and are expected generally to share the same house preferences. Many commentators have wondered whether there is any purpose for having a second chamber if it has the same house preferences as the first chamber, and hold that divergent house preferences are a necessary condition to justify bicameralism. Other commentators have argued that even if the chambers and their respective house preferences are congruent, the informational interaction between the chambers is sufficient for bicameralism to improve the quality of legislation relative to unicameralism. Developing a game theoretic model with informational uncertainty and with identically congruent bicameral chambers, the analysis demonstrates that the informational interaction of acoustically separated chambers can nonetheless improve the objective quality of legislation relative to legislation enacted by a unicameral legislature.

KW - Bicameralism

KW - Game theory

KW - Information theory

KW - Legislatures

KW - Uicameralism

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0035625472&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0035625472&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1177/0951692801013002001

DO - 10.1177/0951692801013002001

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0035625472

VL - 13

SP - 123

EP - 151

JO - Journal of Theoretical Politics

JF - Journal of Theoretical Politics

SN - 0951-6298

IS - 2

ER -