Active hardware attacks and proactive countermeasures

Artemios G. Voyiatzis, Dimitrios N. Serpanos

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Active hardware attacks succeed in deriving cryptographic secrets from target devices. They were originally proposed for systems implementing RSA, Fiat-Shamir (1988) scheme, and Schnorr's scheme. Common targets for these attacks are systems used for client authentication in order to access services, e.g., pay-per view TV, video distribution and cellular telephony. These client systems hold secrets, typically cryptographic keys, owned by the service provider and often implement the Fiat-Shamir identification scheme. Given the strength of active attacks and the increasingly wide deployment of client systems, it is desirable to design proactive countermeasures for them. We focus on the Fiat-Shamir scheme. We prove that the conventional active attack can be easily avoided through appropriate system and protocol configuration; we denote this configuration as the precautious Fiat-Shamir Scheme. We argue that proactive countermeasures against active attacks are feasible and lead to systems that are inherently resistant to active attacks by careful protocol design, rather than ad hoc solutions.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications
Pages361-366
Number of pages6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2002
Externally publishedYes
Event7th International Symposium on Computers and Communications, ISCC 2002 - Taormina-Giardini Naxos, Italy
Duration: 1 Jul 20024 Jul 2002

Other

Other7th International Symposium on Computers and Communications, ISCC 2002
CountryItaly
CityTaormina-Giardini Naxos
Period1/7/024/7/02

Fingerprint

Countermeasures
Attack
Hardware
Authentication
Identification Scheme
Configuration
Target
Denote

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Software
  • Mathematics(all)
  • Signal Processing

Cite this

Voyiatzis, A. G., & Serpanos, D. N. (2002). Active hardware attacks and proactive countermeasures. In Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (pp. 361-366). [1021702] https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCC.2002.1021702

Active hardware attacks and proactive countermeasures. / Voyiatzis, Artemios G.; Serpanos, Dimitrios N.

Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications. 2002. p. 361-366 1021702.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Voyiatzis, AG & Serpanos, DN 2002, Active hardware attacks and proactive countermeasures. in Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications., 1021702, pp. 361-366, 7th International Symposium on Computers and Communications, ISCC 2002, Taormina-Giardini Naxos, Italy, 1/7/02. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCC.2002.1021702
Voyiatzis AG, Serpanos DN. Active hardware attacks and proactive countermeasures. In Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications. 2002. p. 361-366. 1021702 https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCC.2002.1021702
Voyiatzis, Artemios G. ; Serpanos, Dimitrios N. / Active hardware attacks and proactive countermeasures. Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications. 2002. pp. 361-366
@inproceedings{5b174818f9e74a2d88d47c821b539181,
title = "Active hardware attacks and proactive countermeasures",
abstract = "Active hardware attacks succeed in deriving cryptographic secrets from target devices. They were originally proposed for systems implementing RSA, Fiat-Shamir (1988) scheme, and Schnorr's scheme. Common targets for these attacks are systems used for client authentication in order to access services, e.g., pay-per view TV, video distribution and cellular telephony. These client systems hold secrets, typically cryptographic keys, owned by the service provider and often implement the Fiat-Shamir identification scheme. Given the strength of active attacks and the increasingly wide deployment of client systems, it is desirable to design proactive countermeasures for them. We focus on the Fiat-Shamir scheme. We prove that the conventional active attack can be easily avoided through appropriate system and protocol configuration; we denote this configuration as the precautious Fiat-Shamir Scheme. We argue that proactive countermeasures against active attacks are feasible and lead to systems that are inherently resistant to active attacks by careful protocol design, rather than ad hoc solutions.",
author = "Voyiatzis, {Artemios G.} and Serpanos, {Dimitrios N.}",
year = "2002",
month = "12",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1109/ISCC.2002.1021702",
language = "English",
isbn = "0769516718",
pages = "361--366",
booktitle = "Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Active hardware attacks and proactive countermeasures

AU - Voyiatzis, Artemios G.

AU - Serpanos, Dimitrios N.

PY - 2002/12/1

Y1 - 2002/12/1

N2 - Active hardware attacks succeed in deriving cryptographic secrets from target devices. They were originally proposed for systems implementing RSA, Fiat-Shamir (1988) scheme, and Schnorr's scheme. Common targets for these attacks are systems used for client authentication in order to access services, e.g., pay-per view TV, video distribution and cellular telephony. These client systems hold secrets, typically cryptographic keys, owned by the service provider and often implement the Fiat-Shamir identification scheme. Given the strength of active attacks and the increasingly wide deployment of client systems, it is desirable to design proactive countermeasures for them. We focus on the Fiat-Shamir scheme. We prove that the conventional active attack can be easily avoided through appropriate system and protocol configuration; we denote this configuration as the precautious Fiat-Shamir Scheme. We argue that proactive countermeasures against active attacks are feasible and lead to systems that are inherently resistant to active attacks by careful protocol design, rather than ad hoc solutions.

AB - Active hardware attacks succeed in deriving cryptographic secrets from target devices. They were originally proposed for systems implementing RSA, Fiat-Shamir (1988) scheme, and Schnorr's scheme. Common targets for these attacks are systems used for client authentication in order to access services, e.g., pay-per view TV, video distribution and cellular telephony. These client systems hold secrets, typically cryptographic keys, owned by the service provider and often implement the Fiat-Shamir identification scheme. Given the strength of active attacks and the increasingly wide deployment of client systems, it is desirable to design proactive countermeasures for them. We focus on the Fiat-Shamir scheme. We prove that the conventional active attack can be easily avoided through appropriate system and protocol configuration; we denote this configuration as the precautious Fiat-Shamir Scheme. We argue that proactive countermeasures against active attacks are feasible and lead to systems that are inherently resistant to active attacks by careful protocol design, rather than ad hoc solutions.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=43949136237&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=43949136237&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/ISCC.2002.1021702

DO - 10.1109/ISCC.2002.1021702

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:43949136237

SN - 0769516718

SN - 9780769516714

SP - 361

EP - 366

BT - Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications

ER -