A game theoretic framework for incentives in P2P systems

C. Buragohain, D. Agrawal, S. Suri

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

208 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are self-organizing, distributed systems, with no centralized authority or infrastructure. Because of the voluntary participation, the availability of resources in a P2P system can be highly variable and unpredictable. We use ideas from game theory to study the interaction of strategic and rational peers, and propose a differential service-based incentive scheme to improve the system's performance.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, P2P 2003
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages48-56
Number of pages9
ISBN (Print)0769520235, 9780769520230
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2003
Externally publishedYes
Event3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, P2P 2003 - Linkoping, Sweden
Duration: 1 Sep 20033 Sep 2003

Other

Other3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, P2P 2003
CountrySweden
CityLinkoping
Period1/9/033/9/03

Fingerprint

Peer to peer networks
Game theory
Availability

Keywords

  • Availability
  • Centralized control
  • Computer science
  • Control systems
  • Distributed computing
  • Economic forecasting
  • Game theory
  • Incentive schemes
  • Intelligent networks
  • Peer to peer computing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Buragohain, C., Agrawal, D., & Suri, S. (2003). A game theoretic framework for incentives in P2P systems. In Proceedings - 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, P2P 2003 (pp. 48-56). [1231503] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/PTP.2003.1231503

A game theoretic framework for incentives in P2P systems. / Buragohain, C.; Agrawal, D.; Suri, S.

Proceedings - 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, P2P 2003. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2003. p. 48-56 1231503.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Buragohain, C, Agrawal, D & Suri, S 2003, A game theoretic framework for incentives in P2P systems. in Proceedings - 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, P2P 2003., 1231503, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 48-56, 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, P2P 2003, Linkoping, Sweden, 1/9/03. https://doi.org/10.1109/PTP.2003.1231503
Buragohain C, Agrawal D, Suri S. A game theoretic framework for incentives in P2P systems. In Proceedings - 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, P2P 2003. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2003. p. 48-56. 1231503 https://doi.org/10.1109/PTP.2003.1231503
Buragohain, C. ; Agrawal, D. ; Suri, S. / A game theoretic framework for incentives in P2P systems. Proceedings - 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, P2P 2003. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2003. pp. 48-56
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