Abstract
Sensor networks are often subject to physical attacks. Once a node's cryptographic key is compromised, an attacker may completely impersonate it, and introduce arbitrary false information into the network. Basic cryptographic security mechanisms are often not effective in this situation. Most techniques to address this problem focus on detecting and tolerating false information introduced by compromised nodes. They cannot pinpoint exactly where the false information is introduced and who is responsible for it. We still lack effective techniques to accurately identify compromised nodes so that they can be excluded from a sensor network once and for all. In this paper, we propose an application-independent framework for identifying compromised sensor nodes. The framework provides an appropriate abstraction of application-specific detection mechanisms, and models the unique properties of sensor networks. Based on the framework, we develop alert reasoning algorithms to identify compromised nodes. The algorithm assumes that compromised nodes may collude at will. We show that our algorithm is optimal in the sense that it identifies the largest number of compromised nodes without introducing false positives. We evaluate the effectiveness of the designed algorithm through comprehensive experiments.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | 2006 Securecomm and Workshops |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Dec 2006 |
| Externally published | Yes |
| Event | 2006 Securecomm and Workshops - Baltimore, MD, United States Duration: 28 Aug 2006 → 1 Sep 2006 |
Other
| Other | 2006 Securecomm and Workshops |
|---|---|
| Country | United States |
| City | Baltimore, MD |
| Period | 28/8/06 → 1/9/06 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Communication
Cite this
A framework for identifying compromised nodes in sensor networks. / Zhang, Qing; Yu, Ting; Ning, Peng.
2006 Securecomm and Workshops. 2006. 4198806.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - A framework for identifying compromised nodes in sensor networks
AU - Zhang, Qing
AU - Yu, Ting
AU - Ning, Peng
PY - 2006/12/1
Y1 - 2006/12/1
N2 - Sensor networks are often subject to physical attacks. Once a node's cryptographic key is compromised, an attacker may completely impersonate it, and introduce arbitrary false information into the network. Basic cryptographic security mechanisms are often not effective in this situation. Most techniques to address this problem focus on detecting and tolerating false information introduced by compromised nodes. They cannot pinpoint exactly where the false information is introduced and who is responsible for it. We still lack effective techniques to accurately identify compromised nodes so that they can be excluded from a sensor network once and for all. In this paper, we propose an application-independent framework for identifying compromised sensor nodes. The framework provides an appropriate abstraction of application-specific detection mechanisms, and models the unique properties of sensor networks. Based on the framework, we develop alert reasoning algorithms to identify compromised nodes. The algorithm assumes that compromised nodes may collude at will. We show that our algorithm is optimal in the sense that it identifies the largest number of compromised nodes without introducing false positives. We evaluate the effectiveness of the designed algorithm through comprehensive experiments.
AB - Sensor networks are often subject to physical attacks. Once a node's cryptographic key is compromised, an attacker may completely impersonate it, and introduce arbitrary false information into the network. Basic cryptographic security mechanisms are often not effective in this situation. Most techniques to address this problem focus on detecting and tolerating false information introduced by compromised nodes. They cannot pinpoint exactly where the false information is introduced and who is responsible for it. We still lack effective techniques to accurately identify compromised nodes so that they can be excluded from a sensor network once and for all. In this paper, we propose an application-independent framework for identifying compromised sensor nodes. The framework provides an appropriate abstraction of application-specific detection mechanisms, and models the unique properties of sensor networks. Based on the framework, we develop alert reasoning algorithms to identify compromised nodes. The algorithm assumes that compromised nodes may collude at will. We show that our algorithm is optimal in the sense that it identifies the largest number of compromised nodes without introducing false positives. We evaluate the effectiveness of the designed algorithm through comprehensive experiments.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=50049094102&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=50049094102&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359546
DO - 10.1109/SECCOMW.2006.359546
M3 - Conference contribution
SN - 1424404231
SN - 9781424404230
BT - 2006 Securecomm and Workshops
ER -