A fault-injection attack on Fiat-Shamir cryptosystems

Artemios G. Voyiatzis, Dimitrios N. Serpanos

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Fault-injection attacks and cryptanalysis is a realistic threat for systems implementing cryptographic algorithms. We revisit the fault-injection attacks on the Fiat-Shamir authentication scheme, a popular authentication scheme for service providers like pay per view television, video distribution and cellular phones. We present a new and effective attack on cryptosystems that implement the Fiat-Shamir identification scheme. The attack is successful against all system configurations in contrast to the original Bellcore attack, which has been proven incomplete (easy to defend against).

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
EditorsN.-F. Tzeng, M. Takizawa
Pages618-621
Number of pages4
Volume24
Publication statusPublished - 12 Jul 2004
Externally publishedYes
EventProceedings - 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops - Hachioji, Japan
Duration: 23 Mar 200424 Mar 2004

Other

OtherProceedings - 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops
CountryJapan
CityHachioji
Period23/3/0424/3/04

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Authentication
Cryptography

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Hardware and Architecture

Cite this

Voyiatzis, A. G., & Serpanos, D. N. (2004). A fault-injection attack on Fiat-Shamir cryptosystems. In N-F. Tzeng, & M. Takizawa (Eds.), Proceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (Vol. 24, pp. 618-621)

A fault-injection attack on Fiat-Shamir cryptosystems. / Voyiatzis, Artemios G.; Serpanos, Dimitrios N.

Proceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems. ed. / N.-F. Tzeng; M. Takizawa. Vol. 24 2004. p. 618-621.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Voyiatzis, AG & Serpanos, DN 2004, A fault-injection attack on Fiat-Shamir cryptosystems. in N-F Tzeng & M Takizawa (eds), Proceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems. vol. 24, pp. 618-621, Proceedings - 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops, Hachioji, Japan, 23/3/04.
Voyiatzis AG, Serpanos DN. A fault-injection attack on Fiat-Shamir cryptosystems. In Tzeng N-F, Takizawa M, editors, Proceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems. Vol. 24. 2004. p. 618-621
Voyiatzis, Artemios G. ; Serpanos, Dimitrios N. / A fault-injection attack on Fiat-Shamir cryptosystems. Proceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems. editor / N.-F. Tzeng ; M. Takizawa. Vol. 24 2004. pp. 618-621
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